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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS UPON PETITION FOR .REHEARING
NATURE OF CASE
Centurian Corporation ("Centurian") brought an action against
A. L. Cripps and Walter A. Cripps ("Cripps"), claiming a delinquent
amount due under a lease agreement to repossess a tank trailer, the
subject matter of the lease.

Subsequently, Petty Motor Lease, Inc.

("Petty"), claiming to be the owner of the vehicle leased by
Centurian to Cripps moved to intervene in the action.
intervene was granted.
number and file.

The motion to

However, the case was filed in a separate

Trial was held July 13, 1976.

The trial court,

in a memorandum decision and in the judgment, held that it was without jurisdiction of the complaint of Petty against the defendants in
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intervention, Centurian Corporation, Richard Nickles and Margaret
K. Nickles.
Petty appealed and Centurian and Nickles cross-appealed.
This court remanded the matter back to the trial court and the
trial court gave relief to Petty as against Centurian and Nickles
but denied relief to Centurian and Nickles as against Cripps.

Both

Petty and Centurian/Nickles sought additional relief of the trial
court by way of motions to amend, but both motions were denied.
Centurian and Nickles timely perfected this appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants Centurian and Nickles seek a reversal of the
trial court and a judgment in their favor against Petty; or in
the alternative a reduction in the judgment in favor of Petty
together with relief against Cripps in whatever amount Petty obtains
against Appellants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In February 1973, Centurian and Nickles leased a new 1973
trans-liner semi tank trailer from Petty.

The lease is dated

February 1, 1973 and is guaranteed by Richard H. Nickles and
Margaret K. Nickles individually.

(Exhibit 7-I)

At the same time

an additional document was executed wherein Centurian, at the end
of the lease agreed to purchase, after all payments under the lease
have
by

been paid, for the sum of $621.00.

This document is guaranteed

Richard H. Nickles only and not by Margaret K. Nickles.

(Exhibit
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Centurian used the trailer for a few loads and then leased
the same to Cripps.

Cripps was to hold Centurian and Nickles

harmless under the terms of the lease and or purchase agreement.
(Exhibit P-1)

It was admitted by Cripps at trial that they were

in default of the payments as required by Exhibit P-1 and the trial
court granted judgment for all past due payments on the trailer to
Centurian.
In February or March 1974, the tank trailer was stolen by
a person or persons unknown.
Carbon County Sheriff.

This theft was duly reported to the

(Record, 269; Exhibit 4-P)

At the time

of said theft, Centurian/Nickles was current on the obligation to
Petty.

(Exhibit 9-I)
Exhibit 7-I, which was drafted by Petty, specifically

required Centurian/Nickles to provide insurance for public liability.
The provisions relating to insurance coverage for fire, theft,
comprehensive and collision have been left blank, but does recite
that Petty may have in effect insurance coverage for fire, theft,
comprehensive and collision and that if Centurian/Nickles furnishes
a policy for this coverage, then Petty would cancel their own
coverage.
The lease further provides for termination automatically if
any rental payment is not paid within ten (10) days of the due date.
There was a payment due on March 15, 1974 for March.
made by either Centurian/Nickles and/or Cripps.

No payment was

There was a deposit

of $3,594.63 made on February 1, 1973 to insure faithful performance
of the lease and return of the property.

If there is a violation

of the lease agreement, Petty may retain such portion to compensate
for the Sponsored
loss byor
damage.
(Exhibit 7-I)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE RAISED BY
APPELLANT THAT MARGARET K. NICKLES DID NOT SIGN THE
PURCHASE AGREEMENT.
Exhibit 8-I which purports to be the purchase agreement is
executed by Centurian Corporation as purchaser and guaranteed by
Richard Nickles only and not by Margaret K. Nickles.

This court

in its decision dated January 29, 1981 at Page 5 of said decision
stated:
"Construing both agreements together it was
reasonable to conclude that Centurian commenced purchase
of the tank trailer upon signing the "Agreement of
Sale and Purchase", the incorporated prior "Lease
Agreement" being merely a means to that end."
The agreement of purchase, Exhibit 8-I, would then supercede and negate any "lease" entered into between the parties.
Since this court awarded judgment in the decision dated January
29, 1981 for the total purchase of said tank trailer the lease
in fact becomes a nullity.
It is conceded that Margaret K. Nickles guaranteed
performance of the lease, but she did not guarantee the performance
of the purchase agreement.

POINT II
IF THE LEASE AGREEMENT IS VALID AS AGAINST MARGARET K.
NICKLES IT WAS. TERMINATED AS OF MARCH 25, 1974.
Exhibit 7-I which is the lease agreement which is
guaranteed by Margaret K. Nickles provides the following:
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"If any rental payment is not paid within ten (10) days
the due date ~hereof, ~his lease shall automatically
expire . . . . If this lease is terminated by either owner
or user for any reason or expires as provided in paragraph 1, hereof, user agrees to pay to owner any and all
past due payments or other sums then due under the terms
of this lease including but not limited to, the cost of
repairs required to bring the property to good condition
plus the final lease payment in full and in addition thereto, to pay 45% of the monthly rental multiplied by the
number of months this lease has yet to run, which sum is
to compensate owner for the greater costs and depreciation
occurring during the first part of the lease as compared
to the last part of the lease."
aft~r

There was a payment due on or before March 15, 1974.
payment was not made nor any thereafter.
there was no lease in force.

That

As of March 25, 1974

It had been automatically terminated

by the express language of the lease drafted and prepared by Petty
Motor Lease, Inc.

There would be twenty installments due of $508.00

which equals $10,160.00.

Forty-five percent of $10,160.00 equals

$4,572.00 plus the last installment of $508.00

equals $5,800.00.

However, there was a deposit which was utilized expressly for the
purpose of insuring the performance of the lease of $3,594.63 which
leaves a net due as of Margaret K. Nickles of less than $2,000.00.
However, the foregoing analysis really has no bearing to the
actual damages sustained since the trailer was stolen and no damages
were in fact incurred beyond Petty's own risk (as to a lessee) the
case of Brown vs. Rennels, 539 P.2d 1312 (Colo. 1975) states:
. . . [L]iquidated damages are not recoverable in
addition to actual damages."
(citations omitted)
There are no actual damages in this instance because this court has
heretofore as of January 29, 1981 impressed a judgment as against

Centurian and Richard Nickles for the full value of said tank traile:
under the terms of the purchase agreement.

Therefore Petty is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

estopped to assert any liquidated damages as against Margaret K.
Nickles.

POINT III
THAT MARGARET K. NICKLES IS A LESSEE ONLY AND THEREFORE
ABSENT NEGLIGENCE ON MARGARET K. NICKLES' PART CANNOT BE
HELD FOR THE RISK OF LOSS OF THE TANK TRAILER.
The uncontroverted evidence discloses that Petty had actual
knowledge of the sub-lease agreement (and/or sale) to Cripps.

At

page 74 of the record there appears an assignment, wherein Petty
acknowledges the Centurian-Cripps Agreement and gives Centurian
all right and interest to pursue its cause of action.

Centurian

did not have possession of, nor control of, the trailer at the time
of its loss by theft.

Mr. Walter Cripps testified at page 269:

Q.

When was the last time that you saw the trailer?

A.

February of '74.

Q.

And where was it at that time?

A.

Henry Mills' property in Lower Middle Creek.

Q.

Where is that?

A.

South of Price about four miles.

Q.

Carbon County?

A.

Carbon County.

Q.

Do you know where the trailer is today?

A.

I do not.

Where is Lower Middle Creek?

Q.

Have you a record -- well, what has happened to the
trailer? Do you know what has happened to it?

A.
The trailer was stolen, taken off from Henry Mills'
property without permission.
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Q.

Did you make any report of that to the authorities?

A.

As soon as I found out it was stolen I reported it.

Q.
Calling your attention to Exhibit 4P, were you the
person who reported that missing trailer on that particular
date?

A.

To the best of my knowledge that is true and correct.

The trial court found, at page 109 of the record:
12.
That on or about March 15, 1974, the tank trailer
was stolen.
13.
The·record is absolutely devoid of any evidence that
Defendants were negligent or failed to take proper care to
the tank trailer so as to prevent it from being stolen.
Centurian/Nickles did not even have possession of the
trailer at the time of the theft, but were seeking to obtain
possession by way of a Writ of Replevin.

The law has long been

established under circumstances of bailment for hire that in the
absence of negligence the bailee is not liable for an act of a
third party intervenor.

In 8 Am.Jur.2d Bailments §201 by the

following language:
Unless a bailee has violated his contract he will
not be liable in the absence of negligence, for
loss of injury in respect to the thing bailed,
resulting from the inherent nature of the property
itself or some infirmity thereof, from disaster or
accidental casualty or from robbery, burglary, or theft.
This general law has been applied by this court in the case
of Barlow Upholstry and Furniture Co., v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900
1975).

(Utah

In the case of Stehle Equipment Co. v. Alpha Construction

& Dev. Co., 247 Md. 210, 230 A.2d 654

(1967) the Maryland court in

addressing this question stated at page 655:
In its brief, appellee conceded that there was a
bailment for hire which imposed upon the bailee an
obligation to exercise ordinary care and diligence
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in using and safeguarding the bailed property and to
return it in as good condition, ordinary wear and tear
excepted, as when it was received. (citations omitted)
Once appellant proved the delivery, the bailment for hire,
and the unexplained failure to return the property in its
condition when received, a prima facie case of negligence
was made out. However, where the loss was accounted for
as having been occasioned by a cause which would excuse
the bailee, the defense was complete unless the bailor
followed by showing that the bailee, by the exercise of
ordinary care, might have avoided the injury. (citations
omitted and emphasis supplied)
This same view has been held by the Texas court in Tuloma
Rigging, Inc. v. Barge and Crane Rentals, Etc., 460 S.W.2d 510
(Texas 1970) wherein it states:
We think it is the law that if a lessee, without fault,
is denied useful possession of the leased property, the
purpose of the lease agreement is so frustrated as to
discharge lessee of his obligation further to pay rent.
A mutual benefit bailee is not liable if the subjectmatter of the bailment has been injured by some internal
decay, by accident, or by some other means wholly without
his fault, and in the absence of some special stipulation,
as injury to or loss of the property usually falls on the
bailor. The bailee, however, is required to exercise
ordinary care to preserve and protect the bailed property
in the absence of agreements providing otherwise.
(citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
To the same effect is the Gray Eagles, Inc. v. Lucchese,
37 Mich. App. 322, 194 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. 1972).

The act of theft

was an independant act over which Centurian/Nickles had no control.
The only possible thrust of negligence would be the choosing of
Cripps as a sub-lessee.

No allegation exists of said negligence,

nor was any proof offered by any party of any negligence on behalf
of anyone.
A.

It is therefore submitted that:
Petty assumed the risk by the insurance provisions

of the contract (Exhibit 7-1).
B.

Petty as bailer assumed that risk as a matter of law
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absent any negligence on the part of Centurian/Nickles and/or
Cripps.
Since the subject matter of the lease itself no longer
exists, there can be no performance demanded of Centurian/Nickles
by Petty absent that element of negligence.
in fully through the time of the theft.

The lease was paid

Thereafter, no further

payments were due, since Petty could no longer perform ·its part
of the bargain, to wit:

no trailer.

POINT IV
PETTY MADE AN ELECTION OF REMEDY.
Once a party has made an affirmative act of election of
remedies, he is bound.

Utah has adopted this view.

In the

cases of Utah Idaho C.R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah
364, 35 P.2d 842; Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Universal

c.

I. T.

Credit Corp., 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P.2d 1045; and Cook v. CoveyBallard Motor Co., 69 Utah 161, 253 P. 196 all adopt and sustain
the doctrine of election of remedies.

Indeed, in Cook the court

held:
The true rule seems to be (1) that there
must be, in fact, two or more coexisting remedies
upon which the party has the right to elect; (2)
the remedies thus open to him must be alternative
and inconsisten;
and (3) he must by actually bringing
an action or by some other decisive act, with
knowledge of the facts, indicate his choice between
these inconsisten remedies . . . . With such elements
present, an election once deliberately made by the
institution of a suit, by which the remedy is sought
to be recovered, is final, and his failure to secure
satisfaction by means of the remedy which he has
adopted furnishes no legal reason to permit him to
resort to the other.
The rationale of this doctrine is that once a party has
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acted in choosing between two or more different and coexisting
modes of procedure and relief allowed by law that the party is
thereafter precluded to a resort to the other remedy or relief.
Election of remedies differs from estoppel in that an
election, to be effective, need not be acted upon by the other
party by way of detrimental change of his position, provided the
election is a

de~isive

one.

Plaintiff elected to sue for a sale to Centurian and
R. H. Nickles.

Plaintiff therefore elected his remedy and

cannot now seek an alternative relief as against Margaret K. Nickles
on the theory of lease, which is inconsistent with a sale.
The election is absolute, irrevocable, final and conclusive.
It matters not whether plaintiff actually gets final or even full
relief, however, in this instance Petty did in fact receive full
and complete relief.

Under §32 Election of Remedies, 25 Am.

Jur.2d p. 674, 675, it states:
Where a party . . . makes an election
between inconsistent remedies, . . . his election
is final, conclusive, and irrevocable, and constitutes an absolute bar to any action, suit, or
proceeding inconsistent with that asserted by the
election.
It is the first act of election that acts
as a bar.
This is supported by the case of Salt Lake City v. Industrial
Commission, 81 Utah 213, 17 P.2d 239, wherein the court concluded
that it is the first decisive act of election that is binding.
Petty's first decisive act was filing the Complaint in
Intervention whereas he sought a "sale" as opposed to a "lease".
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CONCLUSION
It is essential that this court address this issue of the
liability, if any, of Margaret K. Nickles in light of the decision
of January 29, 1981.

That in order to be consistent with that

decision there cannot be any liability imposed or impressed upon
Margaret K. Nickles based upon formal requirements as provided
under Utah law ?OA-2-201, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
nor is there any contractural obligation to be impressed upon
Margaret K. Nickles for which recovery could be sustained in favor
of Petty Motor Lease, Inc.

Since Petty Motor Lease, Inc. has been

fully compensated by the decision heretofore entered by this court.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the judgment heretofore
entered against Margaret K. Nickles be vacated and reversed.
DATED this the

1¢

day of February, 1981.

r

JARDINE, LINEBAUGH,

BROWN-&

DUNN
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